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Abstract 
 
This article argues that today in Central and Eastern Europe self-censorship, journalistic freedom and 
autonomy are just as severely affected by economic constraints, oligarchic influences and new 
authoritarianism as they are by their Communist pasts. Either way, journalists know exactly what to 
report, what to omit and how to advance their careers. This is reminiscent of adekvatnost’; a distinct 
strategy employed by Russian journalists, who regard this skill as an expression of professionalism. It 
implies having a ‘feel for the game’ and the ‘right instinct’, which allows them to enjoy a certain level 
of freedom in their work and express their creativity. The authors’ interviews with Latvian and 
Hungarian journalists, editors and producers examined the extent to which adekvatnost’ might be a 
feature of journalism beyond Russia, in particular when a media system faces rising populism and 
oligarch-dominated ownership. As such, knowledge gained about journalistic practices in the countries 
under investigation might also be useful in understanding media development beyond the post-
Communist space, including Western Europe.  
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Introduction 
 
Analysing self-censorship in post-socialist states, this article proposes a new conceptual tool 
with which to investigate journalistic practices against the background of media oligarchisation 
and tightened control. We argue that – rather than a historical legacy of state-led censorship – 
the specific type of self-censorship we see today in the region has been generated by media 
markets in crisis, paired with illiberal state interference. Liberalisation of media markets and 
oligarchic control over the media have become inseparable in many post-socialist countries 
(Balčytienė et al, 2015; Štětka, 2015, Dragomir, 2019). This means that market led self-
censorship practices have merged with those traditionally employed by the state.  
After a post-2008-financial-crisis exodus of foreign investors, domestic businesses 
filled the empty spaces. These tycoons are on a range from highly loyal to outright submissive 
to the government (see, Štětka, 2015). Heightened economic difficulties and strengthened state-
led control have given rise to precarious working conditions, a tight job market as well as time 
and budget constraints on newsrooms and editorials (Metykova & Cezarova, 2009; Štětka, 
2016). Wherever populists are in power, freedom of speech has been attacked and restrictive 
media laws have been enacted (Bajomi-Lázár, 2014). These ingredients form the ideal breeding 
ground for a type of self-censorship which we term adekvatnost’, which can be understood as 
a ‘feel for the game’ (in a Bourdieusian sense) – manoeuvring skills that open up space for 
journalistic creativity and negotiated freedom of expression.  
After introducing adekvatnost’ in more detail, we test the concept on the cases of 
Hungary and Latvia. Self-censorship as a means to opening up new channels for creativity and 
professional expression is a phenomenon not limited to Central and Eastern Europe. All over 
the globe, especially in (semi-)authoritarian contexts, we have seen similar endeavours and 
experiments, both in terms of the newly installed mechanisms of control as well as how 
journalists responded to them (see Bar-Tal, 2017; Festenstein, 2018). Many democracies are 
home to large privately-owned media empires. Especially those hosting strong populist 
movements or leaders have embraced authoritarian features (Krämer, 2018; Repucci, 2018). 
We, therefore, conclude that the phenomenon of adekvatnost’ might sooner rather than later 
become relevant for Western Europe and the US. Such a scenario would mean that an 
examination of ‘the East’ will become highly instructive for media scholars and sociologists of 
journalism to understand what is about to happen in ‘the West’.  
 
Self-censorship and negotiated creativity  
 
Self-censorship is a contested phenomenon, and scholars have not so far arrived at a universally 
accepted definition, either with regard to its theoretical implications, or to its empirical 
investigability (Rantanen, 2013). The most common approach is to perceive self-censorship as 
a milder form of censorship and as an inevitable side effect of faulty democracies (Simons and 
Strovsky, 2006; Kenny and Gross, 2008; Tapsell, 2012, Bunn, 2015). Some researchers deny 
the existence of self-censorship altogether, in the sense of acknowledging it as a distinct 
category, rather than simply consequence of external censorship (see, for example, Cook and 
Heilmann, 2010, 2013). As for Russia, most observers, including Castells (2009), consider self-
censorship to be the dominant practice of media control, alongside the state-led production of 
fake news and the clamp down on disagreeable media outlets.  
We aim to conceptually advance debates in the sociology of journalism, media control 
and oligarchisation. We contest the idea that self-censorship is necessarily coercively imposed 
on individuals and a direct result of explicit political pressure, interference or fear (Vartanova, 
2011; Kenny & Gross, Clark & Grech, 2017, Human Rights House Foundation, 2006; for a 
critique of this assumption, see Lee & Chan, 2009; Litvinenko & Toepfl 2019). Instead, we 
claim that self-censorship can spring from a range of motivations and can have a range of 
effects, both productive and prohibitive (see also Burt, 1998). Research on journalism in 
authoritarian states has suggested that self-censorship can, in fact, foster media freedom. As 
Tong claims in relation to China, this is because the art of skilled self-censoring helps 
journalists bypass minefields and therefore increases the chances of them being able to publish 
material that is less explosive and yet highly topical, and sometimes even politically sensitive 
(2009: 594). 
We further argue that journalists often respond to self-censorship craftily and 
creatively, transforming self-censoring from something imposed by fear or coercion into 
something they perceive to be productive and something they practice effortlessly, without 
requiring any identifiable censor. The routinisation of self-censorship is also reminiscent of a 
process described by Norbert Elias (1982): most of what we perceive as voluntary compliance 
was once exposed to external coercion and constraints (Fremdzwänge), before becoming 
internalised and seemingly self-imposed normative behaviour (Selbstzwänge). Once practices 
are perceived as self-imposed, they easily become part of a journalist’s professional identity.  
Such voluntary obedience is reminiscent of what Max Weber (1978 [1922]) referred to 
as occurring under charismatic, patrimonial rule, an essential part of which is reciprocity: those 
demonstrating unquestioned devotion get rewarded, whereas those who are defiant are 
punished. A liberating effect is achieved by those journalists who do not struggle with 
obedience and subordination and simultaneously know how to harness the rules of the game to 
pursue their professional goals and express their creativity.  
Russian journalists have a name for such expressions of self-censorship; they call it 
adekvatnost’, a noun deriving from the adjective adekvatnyi, which translates into English as 
appropriate or reasonable, in our context as ‘a feel for the game’ or ‘a sense of proportion’. 
We first encountered adekvatnost’ in 2013 when interviewing Russian federal television 
reporters at various levels, from journalists at the bottom end of the hierarchy to famous media 
celebrities (Schimpfössl and Yablokov, 2014). Nobody at that time could have anticipated the 
turbulent events of 2014: the annexation of Crimea, the war in Eastern Ukraine and the rouble 
crisis of December 2014, all of which had dramatic repercussions for Russia’s media (Lipman, 
2014; Kiriya, 2017; Malyutina, 2017). The timing of our first research turned out to be 
serendipitous: 2013 was the last year when journalists were likely to proactively narrate their 
ideas about adekvatnost’ rather than talk about the political events of the day and the immediate 
impact they had on their work.1  
Most of our respondents saw adekvatnost’ as a mandatory quality of anybody who 
aspires to become a top journalist. That is, journalists might be highly professional in their 
craft, but adekvatnost’ distinguished the ‘best’ of them (Schimpfössl and Yablokov, 2017b). 
As with Boyer’s observations regarding East Germany (2003: 529), this is partly due to the 
expectation that top journalists quickly understand, ‘in the best spirit of professional ethics’, 
which questions are not to be asked and which sentences not to be written, without requiring 
any detailed instructions (see also Lee and Chan, 2009: 127).  
This a ‘sense for the game’ is not unlike what Pierre Bourdieu called the ‘right’ habitus 
– the physical embodiment of habits and skills, grounded in an individual's life experience and 
dispositions (Bourdieu, 1984; for post-Soviet specifics of habitus see Eyal et al., 1998). It is 
difficult to teach oneself an ‘appropriate’ habitus; the best ones have it internalised, seemingly 
‘instinctively’, like a ‘second nature’. At the lower end of the adekvatnost’ ranking sit those 
who toe the line too anxiously and do everything necessary to get things right. Too stringent 
self-censorship stifles creativity and makes media products lame and boring.2What 
distinguishes adekvatnost’ from habitus, however, is that the former requires, even encourages, 
a certain level of agency – things change too quickly in Russia. In other words, an outstanding 
journalist might be daring, flamboyant and quirky, but, in best traditions of Weberian 
patrimonial reciprocity, clearly knows how far to go, as overdoing such things or getting them 
wrong would be highly risky in the ever-changing political climate.  
 
Case studies: Hungary and Latvia 
 
By and large, we can observe two slightly diverging developments within Central and Eastern 
Europe. In one set of countries (among them, Hungary, Poland, Belarus and Russia), once 
populist leaders have secured power, they have expanded their monopoly over the media. 
Another group of countries (for example, the Baltic states, and to a certain extent the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia) have so far proven to be less vulnerable to populism. In these countries, 
publicly-controlled media remain intact and allow for reasonably healthy political competition. 
The cases we have chosen – Hungary for the first group and Latvia for the second – are 
characteristic of their respective group’s development. Notwithstanding this, they share a 
number of similarities, in particular when it comes to their twentieth-century histories. Both 
countries experienced Soviet occupation during and after the Second World War. 
Subsequently, Latvia was incorporated into the Soviet Union and Hungary into the USSR-
controlled Eastern Bloc.  
After 1989, both countries, but particularly Hungary, were initially celebrated as 
showcases of democratisation (Magyar, 2016). Hungary held the first ‘proper’ elections in 
1990 and in the early 1990s Budapest became the home of the European offices of several 
international organisations. Latvia too transformed its political institutions immediately after it 
proclaimed independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. In those years of rapid change, state-
led censorship became a thing of the past. Journalists proactively shaped the new media 
landscapes, some working for the newly created independent outlets, others for the modernised 
successors of the previous giants (Rožukalne, 2013b). Despite these similarities, there were 
also clear differences in how their media sectors developed (see Jakubowicz and Sükösd, 2008; 
Metykova and Cisarova, 2009; Štětka, 2012; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2013). Soon after Latvia gained 
independence from the Soviet Union, it began to absorb many elements of the Scandinavian 
media model. In Hungary, however, after a brief period of media freedom in the 1990s and 
early 2000s, the state imposed stricter control over the media.  
The two countries’ trajectories most apparently diverged with the onset of the 2008 
financial crisis, which hit both of them heavily and drove out advertisers and foreign investors. 
This opened up opportunities for regional and local owners to buy up struggling media outlets 
at bargain prices (Urban, 2015). Under the pretext of market pressure, many previously 
dynamic media gave in to political pressure and commercially lucrative approaches, however 
low in quality, such as clickbait (Balčytienė et al., 2015; Lauk and Harro-Loit, 2016). Latvia’s 
public broadcaster has nevertheless preserved its high standards, and a reasonable number of 
independent media as well as high-quality journalism have survived (Rožukalne, 2013b). In 
Hungary, meanwhile, the media landscape acquired oligarchic traits, and the relationships 
between owners and employees became patrimonial (Bajomi-Lázár, 2017b).  
Recent authoritarian tendencies in Hungary resemble in many respects those which 
emerged in Russia a decade earlier (Agh, 2016; Oates, 2013; Vendil Pallin, 2017; Schimpfössl 
and Yablokov, 2017b). This is less the case, however, with the ways in which journalistic 
communities in both countries responded to the new circumstances. Our previous research has 
shown that Russian journalists demonstrate a great level of creativity when elaborating 
strategies to circumvent the constraining side-effects which result from heightened censorship 
and self-censorship (Schimpfössl and Yablokov, 2014; Schimpfössl and Yablokov, 2017b).  
 
Journalist interviews 
 
Our investigation into individual practices and day-to-day dynamics demanded a journalist-
focused angle to our empirical approach; however, not necessarily in form of qualitative 
interviews. When researching a potentially sensitive and, in some respects, intangible topic, a 
mixed range of methods would have been the preferred route to collect material, not least to 
capture things unsaid (Ho, 2008). Interviews alone might only scratch the surface, especially 
where there is an audience that is highly suspicious of self-censoring journalists and, thus, 
prevents them from talking openly about their practices (Kohut, 2000). Despite this, we initially 
encountered adekvatnost’ purely by chance, in the context of a project concerned with 
television content, rather than journalism (Hutchings and Tolz, 2015). The richest accounts in 
our latest interviews with Hungarian and Latvian journalists were again in many cases from 
those who responded to questions other than those directly related to self-censorship.  
Besides self-censorship, the interviews raised questions about the current political and 
social climate and how this affects the media in general. This included working conditions and 
unionisation; how economic troubles impact journalists and their work; and how editorial 
boards interact with their owners. We conducted semi-structured interviews, 15 in Hungary (in 
December 2017) and 14 in Latvia (in April 2018). When sampling, we recruited journalists 
from different outlets; state and non-state, public and private, conservative and liberal as well 
as print, TV, radio and online media.3  
In the analysis, we categorised the material into several themes. First, we identified the 
main elements that pointed to how, when and why journalists might censor themselves, 
according to their own narratives. Those statements appeared most frequently in answers 
relating to newsroom hierarchies, political influence on the daily work of journalists, and 
financial pressures. Next, we explored the origins and causes of current phenomena, as 
experienced by our interviewees.  
 
Hungary 
 
The rising authoritarianism in Hungary has shown strong parallels with Russia (see, for 
instance, Krastev, 2018). More than a decade earlier, Vladimir Putin’s rise to power was closely 
tied to attacks on the largest commercial television channel, NTV (Mickievicz, 2008: 242-264). 
When international investors retreated from Hungary in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, 
businessmen close to Viktor Orbán purchased struggling media outlets (Urban, 2016), a 
process Bajomi-Lázár (2014) calls ‘media colonisation’. The subsequent oligarch-state 
dominance provided Orbán with a powerful base for self-promotion, something that was 
hugely decisive for his party’s election victory in 2010 (Magyar, 2016). In addition, Orbán’s 
government passed changes to the media law which now allows for even more state pressure 
on the independent media (Polyak and Nagy, 2015).  
As was the case with Russia’s journalistic community a decade earlier, in Hungary it 
has also became sharply polarised, with state- and oligarch-owned media counterposing 
oppositional media. Journalists who supported Orbán or were employed by outlets loyal to his 
regime quickly learned how to vociferously oppose those who were critically-minded. Things 
became more complicated when some oligarchs fell out with Orbán, as was the case with Lajos 
Simicska in 2015. The journalistic crews had to follow their owners’ sudden U-turns. After 
Orbán’s next election victory in 2014, any remaining trust among journalists eroded. Self-
censorship was on the rise. According to a study by Urban (2017: 147), in 2015, a third of 
Hungarian journalists concealed or distorted information to protect their jobs. They also began 
to hold back information that might have negative repercussions and be at odds with the 
consensus in their camp in order to prevent the other side obtaining material that could be used 
against them. In some respects, journalism in Hungary is reminiscent of that in Turkey where 
self-censorship may be well-rehearsed but is nevertheless closely and painfully coupled with 
coercion and the fear of punishment (see Yesil, 2014), which is very close to what Elias called 
Fremdzwänge, that is, externally imposed.  
Such gagging orders – some of them self-imposed, others ordered from above – have 
led to innovative practices. A number of journalists told us that they occasionally pass on 
material to colleagues from other outlets if they cannot publish them themselves. Among them 
was Viktor who works for a liberal online medium: ‘When I have a story I really care about 
and I know for sure I can’t get it out through my outlet, I’d rather have it published by a 
colleague elsewhere.’ László, another liberal journalist, elaborated further: ‘If you have a very 
valuable and exclusive source that you don’t want to lose, the safest option is to pass on the 
material to someone in another outlet. That secures you this source for the future.’ 
 
Patrimonial relationships 
 
Patrimonialism – in a Weberian sense – in media management not only affects journalists, but 
also the relationships between editors-in-chief and owners (Roudakova, 2017; Andersson and 
Wiik, 2013; Waisbord, 2013). Several of our interviewees referred us to the story of Gergely 
Dudás, the former editor-in-chief of Index.hu, a high-profile media owned by the oligarch 
Zoltán Spéder. Spéder was a close friend and confident of Viktor Orbán, from whom he 
regularly received highly lucrative state contracts, until the two fell out in 2015. Until then, 
Hungary’s media did not touch Spéder, nor scrutinise his business empire; nor did Dudás in 
his role as the editor-in-chief of one of the media outlets owned by Spéder. Now a scandal 
ensued, and Dudás was taken to task over why he had never looked into Spéder’s businesses. 
Dudás defended himself in several op-eds, referring to his obligation to maintain impartiality. 
Had he not done so, he argued, this would have put his staff at risk. In addition, he had felt the 
need to show loyalty to Spéder (Dudás, 2016).  
Some of the journalists we interviewed defended Dudás. Tiberiu, a former senior editor 
of an oligarch-owned media outlet, made it clear that he dislikes restricting both his own and 
his journalists’ freedom of speech (‘it’s really disgusting, but that’s just what it is’), but he feels 
obliged to do so to protect his staff and maintain his outlet’s viability. Tiberiu explained that 
censorship and self-censorship are straightforward: ‘It comes from the top, the owner, and then 
is passed down – first by myself.’ Tiberiu defends such measures as principled: ‘If you have 
moral problems with the owner, then you should never start working for them.’ Such passionate 
loyalty is not unlike the situation observed by researchers in Asian countries, among them 
Malaysia and Indonesia (Tapsell, 2012: 299). It had taken Tiberiu some time, however, to 
develop such pragmatism. At first, he felt very uneasy when he received an interfering phone 
call from ‘above’: ‘I used to simply say “no” when they called. But then I went back to the 
material, looked at it again and, more often than not, changed one thing or another, replaced a 
photo, changed the title, things like that.’  
Liberal journalists tend to regard those who work for media which are owned by pro-
government oligarchs as little more than propaganda soldiers. The latter are almost as critical 
of their liberal colleagues. ‘What is the point of being unbiased if they are all selling themselves 
out to some kind of Soros, or the European Union?’ asked Gábor rhetorically. Before switching 
to the state-owned newspaper Magyar Idők, this senior journalist held a high position in a 
liberal media outlet. ‘Everyone is bad,’ he said. ‘He who owns the media will play the music; 
there cannot be any independent journalism.’ Fatalist attitudes of this sort are not far off 
conspiratorial thinking, an important feature of authoritarian regimes (on conspiracy theories, 
see Yablokov, 2018). Such views were not confined to Gábor. Many other interviewees voiced 
the suspicion that there must be someone secretly pulling the strings in the background and 
pursuing a hidden agenda, especially when it came to scandalous revelations. 
 
Attila’s strategy: dulling down 
 
Attila started his career in a conservative newspaper in 1990, just after the fall of the Iron 
Curtain, and has been there ever since. He assured us that back then, in the 1990s, nobody 
would have changed a single word in a text, certainly not without having first discussed it with 
the author: 
 
Today they do this all the time, without consulting you. Of course, when you 
experience such things day in day out, you start adapting to it and censoring 
yourself. I’ve come to understand that they don’t mean it personally; it’s just what 
they have to do. It is also implicit that, if I want to keep my job, I’d better play 
along. That doesn’t mean that they gag you completely. I could say what I think, 
but we all know that it’s pointless. 
 
For Attila, things are particularly awkward because he has a passion for Russia which is 
not shared by the owner of his outlet. Attila would love to write more stories about Russia, but 
the owner’s dislike of the country is so strong that he would never allow anything to be 
published which did not paint Russia in a very grim light. This is obviously not what Attila 
wants.  
Attila’s solution is curious: when he writes about Russia, he produces texts that are 
utterly boring and have the most uninspiring titles. This seems somewhat ironic if we compare 
the situation with that of journalists in the West, and what they give as the major reason for 
censorship and self-censorship: they often do not follow up on a story they deem newsworthy 
because they think their editors will find it too boring or complicated and hence not 
commercially viable (Kohut, 2000; Pew Research Center, 2000). For Attila, apparently boring 
journalism is his main chance to get a text he really cares about pass through unnoticed. ‘It is 
a lame compromise, but at least the text will be published. But it is probably better than trying 
to be a revolutionary – and as a result not be published at all.’ 
 
Anticipatory obedience 
 
Like their Russian colleagues, Hungary’s journalists have been exposed to numerous rapid 
changes in ownership and editorial instructions. As long as the oligarch Simicska was friends 
with Orbán, his newspaper Magyar Nemzet was completely accepted by the government. ‘We 
used to read every word from Orbán’s lips and like autopilots attacked the opposition’, 
remembered Máté, one of the paper’s junior writers: ‘Once Simicska and Orbán didn’t get 
along anymore, everything was turned upside-down. Now Simicska is in love with [the far-
right party] Jobbik and starting from page 2 we only cover news about them.’  
A consequence of having to keep pace with permanent changes is anticipatory 
obedience, which is the key for developing adekvatnost’. The freelance journalist Ferenc 
socialises with journalists from both opposition and state-aligned media. He thinks that many 
journalists from both sides massively exaggerate the level of risk they could potentially face if 
they fell a little out of line. Almost the only topic Hungarian authorities are seriously bothered 
about, Ferenc said, is shady financial deals. (‘True, if you write about anything like that, this 
could really backfire and destroy not only you, but your whole outlet.’). Otherwise, he thinks 
journalists could be much more daring, especially state-aligned journalists: ‘They would get 
away with a lot. Our government has a strong authoritarian touch, but they have never crossed 
a certain line. They rarely fire someone.’  
Self-censorship is truly crucial for survival where one probably least expects it: in the 
opposition media. The reason for this is not political, but market-related. While state-loyal 
media receive government support, many of opposition media outlets depend on the loyalty of 
their audiences. Given Hungary’s small population of 10 million, and that the complexity of 
the Hungarian language means that it is spoken by few foreigners, these are by definition 
limited in numbers. Accordingly, as noted by Bajomi-Lázár (2017a: 57), private media in 
Hungary generally promote and reinforce their audiences’ views. Audiences with oppositional 
views expect distinct political approaches and are unlikely to forgive journalists who break 
with these. This is not unlike how Lee and Lin (2006) describe press journalism in Hong Kong. 
Readers expect journalists to monitor those in power. They see newspapers as a platform for 
public debate. The print media market in Hong Kong is highly competitive, and so media 
outlets must meet readers’ expectations. For similar reasons, Hungary’s opposition journalists 
and editors, especially those of small outlets, are very anxious about how to tailor their content 
in order not to upset their core readers and viewers.  
 
Latvia 
 
After 1991, Scandinavia sought to establish influence in the Baltic region. To bring the region’s 
media infrastructure up-to-date, media businesses and NGOs from the Scandinavian countries 
provided know-how, learning technologies, media training and investments (Balčytienė, 2009). 
A few of our respondents were critical of this interference and saw the Scandinavians’ main 
agenda as profit-making rather than investing (Balčytienė and Lauk, 2005; Štětka, 2012). Most, 
however, assessed their engagement rather positively. Marta used to work for the daily 
newspaper Diena, then owned by the Swedish Bonnier group. Until 2008, Diena was the 
flagship media outlet in the market of commercial quality journalism. Marta appreciated the 
training courses Diena ran and the high ethical standards they introduced. Emilija, a journalist 
now working for the finance newspaper Ir, remarked that ‘we had Nordic media trainers before 
we got Nordic banks. They taught us everything: from basic ethics to storytelling and specific 
examples of business writing.’  
After the 2008 financial crisis, Latvian journalists found themselves in a similar 
situation to their Hungarian colleagues: their outlets were purchased by domestic oligarchs who 
soon came to use their new assets for their own economic and political goals. International 
investors retreated (see, for example, Rožukalne, 2012b, 2013b). In 2009, Bonnier sold Diena 
to an unnamed company registered offshore. Later it was revealed that the buyers were Latvian 
business tycoons with a highly dubious reputation (The American Latvian Organization, 2012). 
Their lack of ethics was soon apparent in simple journalistic everyday life. A range of practices 
re-appeared which had long been thought to be features of the past, among them hidden 
advertising.  
 
The Russian question 
 
Almost all of our respondents mentioned the difficulties they experienced when covering 
Russia-related topics and trying not to alienate the large Russian-speaking minority who make 
up one third of Latvia’s population. For centuries there has been a small minority of ethnic 
Russians in Latvia, mostly consisting of political and religious exiles. The number more than 
tripled during the Soviet occupation from 1944 to 1948, and many stayed on after the war. 
Unlike in Lithuania, where the large Russian community has been successfully integrated, the 
Latvian authorities are still anxious about the loyalty of ethnic Russians to Moscow and their 
potential to stir up domestic conflict.  
This situation requires great sensitivity from those engaged in agenda-setting, 
particularly in public media (Petrova, 2017; on Eastern Europe in general, see Voltmer, 2013). 
During the time of our fieldwork in Latvia, the public media’s advisory board criticised a team 
of reporters for allegedly exerting ‘Russian propaganda’. The contentious issue was a 
photograph illustrating a report on the MH17 plane which was hit by a rocket over the Donbass 
region in July 2014. The reporters wanted a photograph depicting the plane’s black box. The 
best image they could find was from the Russian state-aligned news agency Sputnik, a source 
which the advisory board deemed unacceptable. The incident left all sides disgruntled.  
Conflict lines between Russians and Latvians are particularly stark when media 
products touch upon Latvia’s traumatic twentieth-century history. A particularly emotional 
date in the calendar of the Russian-speaking population is the 9th of May, the day on which 
Russians commemorate Soviet victory in the Second World War. Every year crowds of Russian 
speakers gather around the Soviet-built liberator statue (a memorial which actually pre-dates 
not only May 1945, but also the 1944 occupation of Latvia by Soviet forces). Many of those 
commemorating the event share Russia’s nationalist attitudes. Elvita described some of the 
many challenging issues she encounters year after year when covering the commemoration: 
 
I have to weigh every word and have to think hard about ways to approach the 
coverage without offending anybody’s feelings. After all, some of the people who 
join the gathering at the memorial might even have experienced those times. Then 
again, we mustn’t forget that Latvia was occupied by the Soviet Union, so for many 
9 May triggers very traumatic memories. All this leaves public TV (and me as the 
senior editor) with the tricky task of doing justice to all these emotions. Along the 
way I might easily censor myself. 
 
Commercial pressure 
 
Self-censoring practices were most clearly manifested in interviews with journalists who work 
in the commercial sector. Areas that generate solid profits for local businessmen as well as 
benefits for politicians are particularly affected by such pressures (Šulmane, 2011). Dzintara, 
previously a television reporter at a private channel, told us about her experience when 
producing a programme about shockingly low sanitary standards in a large supermarket chain 
(which is reminiscent of an incident reported by Tapsell for Indonesia, 2012: 239). Dzintara 
knew perfectly well that the chain was one of the channel’s main advertisers, but that did not 
hold her back. The management responded sharply and without delay. They first froze 
Dzintara’s and her colleagues’ salaries for a couple of weeks. Eventually they shut down the 
programme. Dzintara was dismissed and became a persona non-grata on Latvia’s media job 
market for a couple of years.  
Repressive measures of the sort Dzintara experienced are rare. This is partly because 
journalists do not often take such risks, but act in the spirit of adekvatnost’. Subsequently, 
owners do not usually feel they need to resort to active coercion and repression. This reinforces 
a patrimonial relationship as laid out by Max Weber. Paula is the editor-in chief of a specialist 
magazine in a highly lucrative business field. The board of trustees who sponsor the magazine 
have never intervened in her work. This has not been necessary, she said. Paula did not need 
an explanation of what we mean by adekvatnost’. She knows it inside out. For example, she 
would never write positively about her board members’ competitors. Her staff have internalised 
all of the major informal rules as well as she has, without ever having required a briefing. 
‘Nobody needs to be told twice’, Paula said, summarising the unspoken codes of practice 
around self-regulation and self-censorship. These, again, were not unlike those collected by 
Tapsell from Indonesian journalists, who have also never had to be reprimanded (2012: 240). 
the lightness of journalists’ behaviour is so deeply internalised that it has long become a 
Selbstzwang, as Elias put it, something not perceived as externally imposed. 
Latvia’s business structure determines certain hierarchies with regards to self-censoring 
pressures. The country is in a key position to play an important and lucrative role in commercial 
transportation across the Baltic Sea and so the cargo business is high up in the hierarchy. Sofija, 
a journalist in her early thirties, told us: ‘You have to be very careful what you say about transit-
related issues. Trade cargo is a huge market and all oligarchs have stakes in this business.’ 
Sofija was brought up as a Latvian speaker. Her English is fluent thanks to her school and 
university education. Given her youth, the Russian language has never played a role in her life, 
nor has learning it ever appealed to her. Towards the end of our interview, we mentioned how 
we initially became aware of adekvatnost’. Despite her very limited knowledge of Russian, 
Sofija got very agitated when she heard the term. She instantly understood all the nuances of 
the word. More importantly, she could very much relate to it. This did not mean that she had 
ever used adekvatnost’ actively herself; rather, she felt that the term expressed so much of what 
she had experienced in her practice as a journalist, but what she never had a name for.  
Sofija then told us her own experience of adekvatnost’. For a time, she worked in a 
private media, a period in her life which she recalled as being both useful and painful. In a 
country as small as Latvia a journalist must know which politician has stakes in what business, 
she explained: ‘With regards to them, you might make a mistake once, maybe twice, but after 
that never again.’ After a dreadful experience when she was repeatedly intimidated so that she 
would refrain from reporting on a commercial scandal, Sofija left private media for a high-
status job as presenter in public media (on commercialisation of Latvian media, see, for 
example, Rožukalne, 2012b). Although her work life became less frightening, she said that this 
skill – ‘knowing the rules of the game’ – had helped her ever since to avoid trouble, for example 
in such matters as libel cases. As if she had acquired the most suitable habitus in a Bourdieusian 
sense, she knows perfectly well how to choose her topics pragmatically, what to say and what 
to discuss. The most important thing is to not become too confident in her seemingly powerful 
position and get carried away with experimentation. Adekvatnost’ is part of her professional 
being. For example, when choosing guests for her show, she never takes great risks. Her 
assessment of the guests’ capacity to be ‘appropriate’ and ‘reasonable’ [adekvatnyi] is the most 
decisive factor. Much of her judgment relies on ‘gut feeling’.  
 
Conclusion 
 
One reason why Sofija responded so strongly to the term adekvatnost’ might lie in her country’s 
history. After the Soviet occupation of Latvia at the end of the Second World War, a large 
Russian population stayed on. This meant that Latvians had dealings with Russians on a daily 
basis (and still have), something of which Hungarians, who enjoyed more freedom in the Cold 
war period, had less experience. Given these circumstances, Sofija could have had substantial 
exposure to the Russian language, even though she never learned it. What contradicts this 
explanation is that adekvatnost’ became Sofija’s second nature – or habitus, to use Bourdieu’s 
term – while she was working for a private media holding which traded almost exclusively 
with Europe. Sofija is in her early 30s, while the Hungarian journalists we interviewed are 
around a decade older. They were professionally socialised in the liberal climate of the 1990s. 
For them Orbán came as a massive shock, the consequences of which they still cannot quite 
deal with. Their journalism is intertwined with political activism (see Rantanen, 2013: 264). 
Their habitus is less ‘mediating’ habitus than the one embodied by Sofija (see Philpotts, 2012: 
60), who perceives adekvatnost’ as exactly the same as her Russian colleagues do:  a ‘sense for 
the game’ which, when played correctly, allows for great freedom in one’s day-to-day life as a 
journalist. 
Sofija’s familiarity with adekvatnost’ challenges the commonly-held idea that in 
countries with a historical legacy of state-led censorship the main reasons for journalists to 
resort to self-censorship are illiberal oppression and the arbitrary application of repressive 
legislation (McNair, 1994; Becker, 2004; Pasti, 2005; Lipman, 2005; Simon, 2006; Lipman, 
2014). Alongside all powerful media markets, the liberalisation of the economy and media 
oligarchisation have become inseparable in Hungary, Latvia and Russia – a dynamic not 
dissimilar to that in several highly developed, semi-authoritarian Asian economies (Tapsell, 
2012: 229).  
This pairing of state-led control and a media landscape dominated by media tycoons 
destroys two myths: first, that high marketisation and aggressive state interference are 
opposites, and second, that censorship is a binary phenomenon, either being generated through 
state repression or through commercial demands. Today, instead of suffering from the 
staggering transformation to liberal democracy, many post-socialist countries display the 
features of an advanced crony media market, dominated by government-loyal media tycoons. 
In Russia, this process started in the aftermath of the 1998 collapse of the rouble; in Hungary 
and Latvia it took place a decade later, with the onset of the 2008 economic crisis.  
The dynamic of adekvatnostisation might have important implications for the study of 
media and press freedom well beyond Eastern Europe. Economic troubles loom large over the 
media markets in Western Europe and, politically, their liberal democracies are increasingly 
challenged by populism (Grattan, 2008). As a result, the study of censorship and self-
censorship in (semi-)authoritarian countries with strong populist features (such as Hungary, 
Poland and Russia) and distinctive post-2008-crisis oligarchic dominance over the media 
market (such as The Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary and Latvia) could provide 
insights into where journalism in many Western European countries, if not globally, may be 
heading. One feature to be studied could be the appearance of something similar to 
adekvatnost’ and dynamics of adekvatnostisation: that is, self-censoring practices among 
journalists which, with the allowances they make for individual creativity, are particularly 
difficult to break. Such a ‘reversed’ perspective on things – to look at ‘the East’ to understand 
what might be happening in ‘the West’ – would in many respects be a game changer for media 
studies, politics, sociology, area studies and beyond.  
 
Endnotes 
 
1 In a follow-up research project in 2015, we tested the concept of adekvatnost’ on Russian 
media managers. Similarly, albeit on a different level of hierarchy and agency, they all turned 
out to have developed sophisticated strategies to handle and execute (informal, not articulated 
and often randomly changing) Kremlin policies, without having any guidelines to follow, and 
without the policies themselves being particularly clear (for a similar phenomenon outside 
Russia, see Lee and Chan, who researched self-censorship in Hong Kong, 2009: 124). Hardly 
any them felt seriously restricted in their freedom (Schimpfössl and Yablokov, 2017a). Their 
role in the patrimonial system is ‘mediating’ (Philpotts, 2012); they are subordinated to the 
Kremlin and their owners but demand adekvatnost’ from their editors and journalists (see also 
Skjerdal, 2010: 114).  
2 To be engaging and entertaining is mandatory in a controlled industry such Russia’s no less 
(Tolz and Teper, 2018). As with many authoritarian states (for China, see Tong, 2009: 596), 
Russian federal television channels are state-aligned, but not entirely state-funded. As they are 
competing for advertisers, they are reliant on being popular amongst viewers. Hence, it is 
crucial that the channels as a whole succumb to logic of Weberian patrimonialism and strike 
the right balance between political obedience and creativity. For the study of journalism this 
means that most media products in Russia are as much an expression of a journalist’s 
personality and tastes as of the Kremlin’s whims or those of the most powerful editors 
(Schimpfössl and Yablokov, 2014). 
3 All the interviewees in Hungary were acting journalists, and three had previously worked as 
editors-in-chief. Two of them worked in the state media, the others in media outlets which are 
either independent or owned by a media mogul. Eight respondents worked for online media, 
five for newspapers and two for television. Only one of our Hungarian interviewees was 
female, while two were under the age of 30. As for Latvia, two of our 14 interviewees had left 
their journalist careers behind and were now running non-governmental organisations. Of the 
remaining twelve, seven worked for public media and six were either acting or former editors-
in chief. Three worked for the radio, four for television, three for newspapers and magazines, 
and two for online media. Nine were female and four were under the age of 30. We have 
changed all names to ensure their anonymity. 
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